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Abstract—Twitter facilitates borderless communication, in-
forming us about real-life events and news. To address privacy
needs, Twitter provides various security settings. However,
users with protected profiles are limited to their friendship
circles and thus might have less visibility from outside of their
networks. Previous research on privacy reveals information
leakage and security threats in social networks despite of
privacy protection enabled. In this context, could protecting mi-
croblogging content be counterproductive for individual users?
Would microbloggers use Twitter more effectively when open-
ing their content for everyone rather than protecting their pro-
files? Are user profile protection features necessary? We wanted
to address this controversy by studying how microbloggers
exploit privacy and geo-location setting controls. We followed
a set of user profiles during half of year and compared their
usage of Twitter features including status updates, favorites,
being listed, adding friends and follower contacts. Our findings
revealed that protecting user accounts is not always detrimental
to exploiting the main microblogging features. Additionally,
we found that users across geographic regions have different
privacy preferences. Our results enable us to get insights into
privacy issues in microblogs, underlining the need of respecting
user privacy in microblogs. We suggest to further research user
privacy controls usage in order to understand user goals and
motivations for sharing and disclosing their microblogging data
online with the focus on user cultural origins.
Keywords-Twitter microblogs; privacy online; user content
protection; geo-location usage; microblogging behavior;
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet data often include cues on user online behavior
and personal information, collected and processed by web
services and applications. Social web sites such as Twitter
and related web/mobile applications allow their users to
connect with friends, sharing information in real time.
Moreover, microblogs and other online resources can be
exploited in business settings for marketing and research
purposes. However, the microbloggers’ personal privacy
needs to be observed and weighted against the practical
benefits provided by microblogs.
Online users’ privacy could be supported with help of
a regulatory framework and software controls. In support
of the human right for privacy, national and international
regulations are being developed to preserve personal privacy
in an online setting. In this respect, the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development guidelines [1] ad-
dress online privacy protection and safe information transfer
via computer networks, to prevent unlawful personal data
access, storage and processing. In support of privacy and
for their users’ benefit, Social Networking (SN) web sites
and applications provide functionality for users to exercise
privacy control of shared user-generated content and meta-
data. For this, different user profile settings and options
across SN web sites help users to hide sensitive information.
Software means and privacy settings are however not yet
very effective. Personal information can still be derived out
of social networks with information retrieval, data min-
ing and machine learning methods [2], and named-entity
recognition techniques [3], [4]. Also, privacy of sensitive
microposts can be violated by the user’s friends reposting
originally protected content [5]. Some Twitter software
clients facilitate information leakage from protected users
[5]. Sensitive topics on diseases or alcohol consumption
could also be revealed by Twitter users, which could benefit
from software tools protecting users from posting sensitive
messages [4].
Despite of the “openness” culture widely appreciated in
Twitter, we argue that for some of the users privacy still
matters. Due to the lack of information on privacy issues
and insufficiency of the privacy protecting mechanisms, it
is paramount to further investigate real user needs, which
might be governed by different purposes and modes of
microblogging usage. For this, we overview the privacy
protection means in Twitter. We analyze user behavior
online to rise awareness towards protecting privacy in
Twitter. While observing how privacy settings are exploited
by Twitter users, we focus our analysis on the usage of
Twitter profile protection and geographic location sharing
features. We followed a set of users for a period of about
six months and analyzed their privacy controls’ usage
with Twitter Application Program Interface (API). We
distinguish between different usage purposes, which we
relate with the usage of geo-location and profile protecting
features. Our main contribution is to study online privacy
controls usage for a set of selected user groups in Twitter.
Next, we outline the main issues and means of protecting
user privacy online with a focus on SN and microblogs.
II. RELATED WORK
Twitter would be much less useful for sharing news
and information in real-time and finding users with similar
interests online, if everyone on Twitter would protect their
status updates. Protecting Twitter messages might be seen as
counterproductive for reaping business opportunities online.
However, in some cases users opt to protect their tweets to
safeguard their personal data. In this section, we discuss the
privacy protection on Twitter and other social networking
applications, possible threats and solutions.
Transparency and User Control: Social networking
web sites such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn often
maintain user data including a user’s network connections,
geographic locations and employment positions respectively,
when provided by the user. Some web applications collect
user personal details explicitly or collect their online activi-
ties with user permission [6]. However, some of the web sites
do not inform their users about data collection performed
[6]. To ensure that user personal details are not shared un-
willingly, users should exercise complete control over their
personal details. The consequences of sharing the personal
data should be thoroughly thought by the users, which
ideally should have a complete control over their data [7].
[8] suggests to exploit personal data stores, in which users
manage their privacy settings while remaining sole owners
of their data. Service providers could further adjust services
to available user data and associated privacy settings [8].
Mining Personal User Data: Furthermore, privacy is a
paramount factor influencing microblogs’ adoption by users
[9]. Microblogs might be perceived as unsafe compared to
other social platforms and therefore not exploited by some of
the users, who are quite cautious about sharing their personal
information online [9]. Indeed, social web makes it possible
to mine openly available user data [7]. Users might publicly
share their preferences, or user activities and traits could be
automatically mined based on their online behavior [7]. In
result, user behavior patterns could be exploited to deduce
user specific traits. For instance, user geographic location
could be inferred based on user-generated content, meta-
data associated with microblogs and user social network
[2], [10]. Personal information can also be derived out of
user social network, online web resources with help of data
mining and named entity recognition techniques [3]. Thus,
explicit user personal information sharing is not required to
collect potentially sensitive information [7].
Information Leaks: Twitter enable users to protect
their accounts. However, due to the nature of microblogs
and their attractive openness, only a small fraction of
about 10% of users protected their accounts [11]. It is not
trivial to manage private information amongst friendship
networks [12]. Indeed, even protected tweets can become
publicly visible when being reposted by the user’s friends
[5]. In [5] dataset, about of 1% of all accounts retweeted
private information of their contacts. The study into how
the personal information can be revealed in microblogs by
[13], exploiting machine learning and human annotations
to estimate the level of sharing of personal information by
microbloggers. As [12] pointed out, existing privacy issues
do not stop online users willing to communicate with their
friends and acquaintances. A “privacy score” could be
applied to user contacts to help in decision making on how
much information could be shared with these contacts [13].
Furthermore, as one of the solutions for supporting
user privacy [14] suggest to use anonymizer methods to
avoid personal information leakage. A prototype using
cryptography and access control of followers was proposed
by [15] in order to protect user-generated content including
hashtags. In support of personal data protection, various
methods of information coding were developed such as
[16]. However, the coded information may be detrimental to
its usage or affect the quality of the stored information [16].
This might be inconvenient for using coded information
in practical applications, since SN web sites are specially
build to facilitate users communication and sharing content.
Thus, usage of these applications and services requires
users to share information to a certain extend, enabling
them to exploit a web site functionality as they require.
Privacy and Cultures: When referring to the human
right regulations, [17] discusses perceptions of privacy in
different cultural settings. It seems that societal values
impact the view of privacy and regulations for different
regions, for instance, in European countries and the United
States [17]. In [4] authors found differences in the infor-
mation leaks, particularly on the topic of “depression”, for
Singapore, the UK, and the US. The level and type of
personal information sharing differs for users from the USA
and Singapore, which tend to reveal personal information
(contact, demographic, education and job) or their feelings
respectively [18]. It is reasonable to assume that the privacy
settings could be used differently amongst cultures. This is
why it is interesting to further investigate how the privacy
controls are exploited by different cultural groups in Twitter.
To summarize, Twitter microblogs allow users to share
their messages and interesting links. The majority of Twitter
accounts are open. Protected accounts are prone to the
information leakage and require further care when sensitive
or personal information is shared within friendship networks.
It seems however that protecting tweets might be counter-
productive and unnecessary, since protected profiles might
block users from new personal or business opportunities
in detriment of fostering user communication on Twitter.
We further analyze whether protected users communicate
and form relations less intensively compared with the open
users and which in result might take more advantage of
microblogging. Finally, we are going to investigate whether
different privacy perceptions across the cultural regions
could affect privacy controls usage.
Table I
FEATURES ANALYSED
Feature Description
INFLUENCE Ratio of Followers to Following (Friends)
STATUSES Number of published tweets
FAVOURITES Number of favorites user posted
LISTED Number of lists in which user was included
FOLLOWERS Number of followers
FRIENDS Number of friends
SOURCES Number of Twitter applications exploited
CHANGES Number of setting changes (enabling/disabling geo-
location services or protecting/opening user profiles)
Table II
CULTURAL DIMENSIONS AND ASSOCIATED COUNTRIES (WE JOINED
COUNTRIES IN RELATION TO THEIR PROXIMITY TO THE APEXES (LA,
MA, RE) OF TRIANGLE REPRESENTING THE LEWIS MODEL)
Cultural Dimensions Top Countries
Linear-Active (LA) The United States (US) and Great Britain (GB)
Multi-Active (MA) Russia (RU), Brazil (BR), Spain (ES), Turkey
(TR), France (FR), Mexico (MX), Italy (IT)
Reactive (RE) Japan (JP) and Indonesia (ID)
III. METHODOLOGY
The main research question was to find out if protect-
ing user accounts hampers an effective communication in
Twitter. We selected a non-exhaustive list of features mostly
available in the Twitter profile and listed in Table I. Next, we
compared protected users activity with microblogging activ-
ity of users with open profiles, and tested the hypothesis:
• H1. Number of friends (FRIENDS feature) which user
follows is fewer for protected user accounts;
• H2. Number of followers (FOLLOWERS) is smaller
for the protected user;
• H3. User influence (INFLUENCE), defined as ratio of
followers to friends, is smaller for the protected users;
• H4. Status updates (STATUSES), or twitter microblogs
posted by the user, are less posted by protected users;
• H5. Number of lists (LISTED) in which user was
included is smaller for the protected users;
• H6. Number of favorites (FAVOURITES) is smaller for
protected users.
Since privacy control designs differ amongst Twitter soft-
ware clients, we also analyze usage of Twitter clients. Our
next hypotheses assume that protected users tend to exploit
and try out different software products and setting changes
in the beginning of Twitter usage, in order to find out which
software and settings fits the best to their needs:
• H7. Number of setting changes (CHANGES) of pro-
tected users is greater compared with the “open users”.
• H8. Number of software clients (SOURCES) of pro-
tected users is greater compared with the “open users”.
In order to detect user cultural preferences for privacy
settings, we adopt the cultural dimensions from the Lewis
Model of Cultures [19] to establish cultural profiles for the
selected countries in Table II. Based on the trait of showing
or concealing personal feelings determining cultural
differences, as defined in the Lewis questionnaire1, we
assumed that Multi-Active (MA) users such as originating
from countries like Russia, Brazil or Spain are likely to
open their user profiles and communicate their opinions
and feelings for a greater audience. In contrast, Reactive
(RE) users from Japan and Indonesia tend to conceal their
feelings, which might be reflected in their preference to close
or protect their Twitter accounts. Linear-active (LA) users
from the United States of America and Great Britain prefer
to partly not expose their feelings and therefore they might
have a smaller fraction of protected profiles compared to RE,
and smaller fraction of open profiles as compared to MA
users. This is why we established the following hypothesis:
• H9. MA users prefer open profiles the most.
• H10. RE users prefer closed profiles the most.
Experimental Setup: It is important to mention that
users change their settings over time and we analyze which
settings are mostly exploited by each particular user. This
is why we follow users who started their microblogs on the
same day and observe how their settings change for about
half of year as follows:
• STEP 1: Collect about 21600 users registered with
Twitter on 26th November 2014 by listening to the
Twitter sample stream for a period of about three days,
from 26th to 29th November 2014;
• STEP 2: Visit the selected user profiles in a period of
about six months and monitor their usage of the geo-
graphic location sharing and profile protection features,
statistics on status updates and friendship/followers
network growth in time; It is important to mention
that Twitter web application and API enable us to
observe aforementioned features (such as number of
connections and status updates) out of protected user
profiles, therefore, our experimental setup does not
violate user privacy while working with aggregated
usage statistics.
• STEP 3: In order to understand user needs for protect-
ing their microblogging content in respect of their cul-
tural origin, we exploited our country-detecting Multi-
nomial Naive Bayes classifier built on text features
extracted from user profile meta-data and joining free-
text of user-defined location, preferred language and
time zone, with a three-times cross-validation accuracy
of about 90%, as described in [2].
• STEP 4: Analyze and interpret the data collected for
addressing the hypothesis stated above. For finding
the privacy needs of the users from respective cultural
1http://bestcareermatch.com/cross-cultural-communication
Table III
PRIVACY AND GEO-LOCATION SETTINGS IN “ PRIVACY AGGREGATED” DATASET: T (TRUE) FOR ENABLED SETTING, OTHERWISE F (FALSE)
Geo-location Protected Verified Description Number of Users
F F F Open profiles without geo-location setting activated 17182
T F F Open profiles with geo-location setting enabled 2973
F T F Protected profiles without geo-location 733
T T F Protected profiles with geo-location setting activated 243
F F T Protected profiles of public persons (or celebrities) disabled geo-location setting 2
100 101 102 103 104 105
Number of Friends
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
FFF
FTF
TFF
TTF
100 101 102 103 104 105 106
Number of Followers
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
FFF
FTF
TFF
TTF
10-2 10-1 100 101 102 103 104
Number of Followers to Friends Ratio
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
FFF
FTF
TFF
TTF
101 102 103 104 105 106
Number of Statuses
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
FFF
FTF
TFF
TTF
10-1 100 101 102 103
Number of Listed
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
FFF
FTF
TFF
TTF
101 102 103 104 105 106
Number of Favorites
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
FFF
FTF
TFF
TTF
Figure 1. Networking and Twitter Features Usage with Different Profile Settings
regions, we grouped countries into cultural dimensions
(regions) as defined by the Lewis model of Cultures.
Data Collection: In the first step, we collected
“Tweets” dataset consisting of 48287 tweets published by
22624 users from 26th to 30th November 2014. These
are tweets published by users registered with Twitter on
26th of November 2014. Out of the set of users from
“Tweets” dataset, we randomly selected 21600 users to be
further followed for the next six months. We exploited our
three Twitter accounts with Twitter Representational State
Transfer (REST) API for retrieving user profiles of the
selected users. These user profile settings were stored into
“Privacy” dataset including information on the number of
published tweets, followers, friends, listed, favorites count;
and also on the geo-location settings turned on, verified (if
person is a celebrity or verified on Twitter) and protected
(their content is only visible to their friends) settings.
It is important to mention, that we do not consider
daily change patterns due to Twitter REST API limitations2
imposed. Due to server maintenance needs and while starting
our data collection, we experienced some interruptions while
storing user profile settings, which did not effect our final
results based on the aggregated statistics for the whole data
collection time.
We observed that some of the users change their settings
to enable geo-location sharing, while others protect their
profiles. We also observed an increase of protected profiles,
from 2.4% to 7.3%, and geo-location sharing profiles, from
2https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public/rate-limits
7.5% to 19%, towards the end of data collection.Having the
data on Twitter usage and user settings for the sampled half
of year, we aggregated the most exploited settings of client
software usage, geo-location sharing and profile protection,
and the maximal number of tweets, friendships, lists and
favorites. These data comprised a “Privacy Aggregated”
dataset, which we further study to find out general behavior
differences amongst Twitter users having certain privacy
and geo-location sharing preferences.
IV. FINDINGS
To summarize for the whole data collection period, about
95% of our users prefer to keep their user profiles openly
available. Geographical location sharing feature is exploited
mostly by 15% of our users. Table III above lists our main
setting combinations. It is important to mention that the FFT
group included “verified” users of two public persons, in our
case a music band and politian, which are disregarded in
the group comparisons when performing unequal variances
statistical tests (Table IV). We observed that these two users
have larger social networks when compared with other user
groups. They also included into more listings. The greatest
group of 17182 users (FFF) prefers open profiles without
geographic information available. The second largest group
of 2973 users (TFF) prefers open profiles while sharing their
geo-locations.
Friends and Followers : Interestingly, the cumulative
distribution function with logarithmic scale helps to
visualize differences between user groups (Figure 1 above).
Particularly, protected users with enabled geo-location
services (TTF) have a greater number of FRIENDS and
FOLLOWERS compared with users with closed profiles
without geo-location settings (FTF). The INFLUENCE of
the latest is however not significantly different from the
former ones ( Table IV).
Status updates, Listed and Favorite Counts : Users
(TTF and TFF) with protected and open profiles, with
geo-location services enabled do post more STATUSES in
average compared to FTF and FFF respectively. TTF and
FFF has no significant differences in their status updates (
Table IV). Users with open and geo-enabled profiles (TFF)
tend to be included into more lists (LISTED), while the
protected users with geo-sharing settings (TTF) compete in
the number of FAVOURITES with open users who do share
their geo-locations (TFF) as well.
Frequency of Setting Changes and Software Clients:
Table IV shows statistically significant differences in
CHANGES feature between open and closed user profiles.
Geo-location sharing users (TFF) changed their applications
(SOURCES) more often compared with the users with
protected accounts (FTF), which in turn change their settings
more in average. Despite of user profile protection, Twitter
still provides information on client software usage shown
in Table V below. Twitter for Android software is used
Table IV
UNEQUAL VARIANCES T-TEST FOR VARIOUS SETTINGS: MEAN (µ),
STANDARD DEVIATION (σ), WELCHS TEST STATISTIC (t), TWO-TAILED
P-VALUE (p)
Feature µgr1 σgr1 µgr2 σgr2 t p
Group1 (Ngr1 = 17182): FFF vs. Group2 (Ngr2 = 733): FTF
INFLUENCE 2.72 105.46 1.76 19.31 0.88 0.37
STATUSES 1810.87 7844.50 1208.69 2321.30 5.75 < 0.01
FAVOURITES 323.78 1793.38 503.16 1782.19 -2.66 < 0.01
LISTED 1.27 7.37 0.74 2.53 4.85 < 0.01
FOLLOWERS 367.30 1902.00 119.79 245.46 14.46 < 0.01
FRIENDS 421.12 1591.38 183.78 349.27 13.39 < 0.01
SOURCES 1.03 0.20 1.03 0.18 0.26 0.78
CHANGES 1.08 0.32 1.92 0.39 -56.34 < 0.01
Group1 (Ngr1 = 17182): FFF vs. Group2 (Ngr2 = 2973): TFF
INFLUENCE 2.72 105.46 2.39 68.48 0.21 0.82
STATUSES 1810.87 7844.50 2144.56 4579.74 -3.23 < 0.01
FAVOURITES 323.78 1793.38 1128.26 3391.42 -12.63 < 0.01
LISTED 1.27 7.37 1.81 6.14 -4.27 < 0.01
FOLLOWERS 367.30 1902.00 320.75 978.62 2.01 < 0.05
FRIENDS 421.12 1591.38 339.87 632.67 4.83 < 0.01
SOURCES 1.03 0.20 1.05 0.23 -3.39 < 0.01
CHANGES 1.08 0.32 1.68 0.69 -45.79 < 0.01
Group1 (Ngr1 = 17182): FFF vs. Group2 (Ngr2 = 243): TTF
INFLUENCE 2.72 105.46 0.75 1.18 2.43 < 0.05
STATUSES 1810.87 7844.50 2157.59 4259.59 -1.23 0.21
FAVOURITES 323.78 1793.38 1301.08 4150.01 -3.66 < 0.01
LISTED 1.27 7.37 1.27 10.93 0.00 0.99
FOLLOWERS 367.30 1902.00 182.81 349.50 6.90 < 0.01
FRIENDS 421.12 1591.38 298.31 474.33 3.74 < 0.01
SOURCES 1.03 0.20 1.03 0.17 0.26 0.79
CHANGES 1.08 0.32 2.76 0.74 -35.13 < 0.01
Group1 (Ngr1 = 733): FTF vs. Group2 (Ngr2 = 2973): TFF
INFLUENCE 1.76 19.31 2.39 68.48 -0.43 0.66
STATUSES 1208.69 2321.30 2144.56 4579.74 -7.79 < 0.01
FAVOURITES 503.16 1782.19 1128.26 3391.42 -6.90 < 0.01
LISTED 0.74 2.53 1.81 6.14 -7.29 < 0.01
FOLLOWERS 119.79 245.46 320.75 978.62 -9.99 < 0.01
FRIENDS 183.78 349.27 339.87 632.67 -8.99 < 0.01
SOURCES 1.03 0.18 1.05 0.23 -2.18 < 0.05
CHANGES 1.92 0.39 1.68 0.69 12.60 < 0.01
Group1 (Ngr1 = 733): FTF vs. Group2 (Ngr2 = 243): TTF
INFLUENCE 1.76 19.31 0.75 1.18 1.41 0.15
STATUSES 1208.69 2321.30 2157.59 4259.59 -3.31 < 0.01
FAVOURITES 503.16 1782.19 1301.08 4150.01 -2.90 < 0.01
LISTED 0.74 2.53 1.27 10.93 -0.74 0.45
FOLLOWERS 119.79 245.46 182.81 349.50 -2.60 < 0.01
FRIENDS 183.78 349.27 298.31 474.33 -3.46 < 0.01
SOURCES 1.03 0.18 1.03 0.17 0.08 0.92
CHANGES 1.92 0.39 2.76 0.74 -16.85 < 0.01
Group1 (Ngr1 = 2973): TFF vs. Group2 (Ngr2 = 243): TTF
INFLUENCE 2.39 68.48 0.75 1.18 1.30 0.19
STATUSES 2144.56 4579.74 2157.59 4259.59 -0.04 0.96
FAVOURITES 1128.26 3391.42 1301.08 4150.01 -0.63 0.52
LISTED 1.81 6.14 1.27 10.93 0.76 0.44
FOLLOWERS 320.75 978.62 182.81 349.50 4.80 < 0.01
FRIENDS 339.87 632.67 298.31 474.33 1.27 0.20
SOURCES 1.05 0.23 1.03 0.17 1.51 0.13
CHANGES 1.68 0.69 2.76 0.74 -21.98 < 0.01
Group1 (Ngr1 = 20155): Open FFF and TFF vs.
Group2 (Ngr2 = 976): Protected FTF and TTF
INFLUENCE 2.67 100.86 1.51 16.75 1.30 0.19
STATUSES 1860.09 7454.24 1444.94 2952.54 3.83 < 0.01
FAVOURITES 442.45 2125.85 701.82 2603.56 -3.06 < 0.01
LISTED 1.35 7.20 0.87 5.87 2.45 < 0.05
FOLLOWERS 360.44 1795.96 135.48 276.22 14.57 < 0.01
FRIENDS 409.13 1489.56 212.30 387.15 12.12 < 0.01
SOURCES 1.03 0.21 1.03 0.18 0.74 0.45
CHANGES 1.17 0.45 2.13 0.62 -47.51 < 0.01
Table V
TOP TWITTER CLIENTS: SOFTWARE (PERCENT OF USERS)
Client FFF TFF FTF TTF
Twitter for Android 24% 52% 38% 51%
Twitter for IPhone 23% 26% 40% 34%
Twitter Web Client 14% 13% 9% 6%
Table VI
PERCENT OF USERS BY CULTURE AND COUNTRY-GROUPS
Culture Country Codes (% of users)
LA US (43.4), GB (1.0)
MA RU (12.0), BR (8.6), ES (7.5), TR (6.6), FR, MX & IT (2.5)
RE JP (16.1), ID (2.4)
by about 30% of our users, followed by Twitter for IPhone
used by 24% and Twitter Web Client used by almost 14% of
users. Twitter Web Client is used the least by geo-enabled
users with closed profiles (TTF). It seems that this user group
prefers to use mobile device applications instead.
Cultural Differences in Privacy Settings Usage: Ta-
ble VI summarizes users classified into their country and
cultural groups, which are compared according to their
profile protection settings. Since we exploited country and
culture predictive models developed in [2], we further as-
sessed their performance on a set of 145 users having
countries referred in their geo-enabled tweets. We observed
that human labels of the 145 user locations matched with
the defined geo-location provided by Twitter in about 86%
of cases. We achieved about 83% and 94% accuracy, 78%
and 94% precision, 83% and 94% recall for the country and
culture group classifications, respectively while comparing
the classification output with the test set of 145 users.
Overall, our cultural group classifier enabled to predict 85%
(40 out 47 users) of LA, 97% of MA (73 out of 75 users)
and 100% of RE (23) users.
Further, we exploited the culture group classification
model to analyze usage of protected and open profiles
for our users set. We found out that MA users have a
larger percentage (98%) of open profiles, while RE have
the greatest percentage (11%) of closed profiles compared
to other cultural groups. Therefore, we could accept our
hypotheses H9 and H10. It seems, that privacy perceptions
or needs differ amongst the cultural groups analyzed.
Summary: Our sample distributions could not satisfy
normality and equal variances assumptions in the majority
of cases. This is why we selected Welch’s unequal variances
statistical test (using Scipy Python library) to compare users
within particular setting groups. This test allowed us to test
if two independent samples have similar averages. When p-
values were p < 0.05, we disregarded the null hypothesis
that the averages are similar. Table IV shows results for
comparing means between paired setting groups, which we
used to accept or reject our research hypothesis, revisited
in Table VII. We arranged Table IV to compare settings
Table VII
HYPOTHESIS REVISITED: WHILE COMPARING OPEN (FFF+TFF) AND
PROTECTED (FTF+TTF) USER PROFILES
Hypothesis Conclusion
H1 Protected users have fewer friends Accepted
H2 Protected users have fewer followers Accepted
H3 Protected users are less “influential” Rejected
H4 Protected users have fewer status updates Accepted
H5 Protected users are less listed Accepted
H6 Protected users have less favorites Rejected
H7 Number of setting changes of protected users is
greater compared with the open users
Accepted
H8 Number of software products (SOURCES) of pro-
tected users is greater compared with the open users
Rejected
H9 MA users prefer open profiles the most Accepted
H10 RE users prefer closed profiles the most Accepted
groups for open profiles, including FFF (open profiles with-
out geo-location services enabled) and TFF (open profiles
with geo-location enabled), and protected profiles, including
FTF (closed profiles) and TTF (closed profiles with geo-
location services enabled). At the bottom of the table we
placed the feature comparison for answering our hypothesis
statements for merged user groups, with open (FFF and TFF)
and protected (FTF and TTF) profiles.
Overall, we accept H4 and H5, since users with publicly
open profiles exploit the Twitter features STATUSES and
LISTED the most compared with users with protected user
profiles. Generally, open profiles attract more followers and
have more friends, such that we could accept our hypotheses
H1 and H2. However, we could not find significant dif-
ferences in the INFLUENCE feature for the geo-location
enabled users (TFF and TTF). As seen from the bottom of
the Table IV, the INFLUENCE does not differ significantly
for users with open and protected profiles. Similarly, the
number of SOURCES is comparable for both user groups.
This is why we cannot accept hypotheses H3 and H8.
Interestingly, users with protected profiles (FTF and TTF)
tend to exploit the FAVOURITES feature more actively
in contrast with open profile users (FFF). However, when
users with open profiles enabled their geo-location settings
(TFF), their favoring statistics was not significantly differ-
ent compared with the users with closed profiles (TTF).
When comparing overall PROTECTED and OPEN user
groups, we found that PROTECTED user profiles exploit
more FAVOURITES compared to OPEN user profiles, and
therefore rejecting H6. We accepted H7 since protected users
performed more setting changes as compared to users with
open profiles.
Furthermore, the protected user profiles with the geo-
location feature enabled (TTF) showed no significant differ-
ences when compared with open user profiles (FFF and TFF)
in the number of STATUSES, LISTED and SOURCES.
Thus, these users are quite active in their publishing be-
havior, since they are included in lists and exploit various
devices and software clients. It seems, that we still need
to consider a profile protecting feature to address this user
group needs. Their motivations of microblogging usage
could further be investigated with a user feedback.
V. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER WORK
Reflection on Our Results: Even though protecting
Twitter profiles might seem to be counterproductive due to
the microblogging nature of networking, around 5% of our
users prefer to close their accounts from public view. We
observed an increase in the number of protected accounts
about threefold in the half year period of following user
accounts. Protecting user accounts in microblogs could
however mislead users into a wrongly perceived safety,
since personal data could still be automatically mined or
revealed by online friends.
Moreover, no significant differences in user influence
and number of exploited Twitter client applications for
protected and open user profiles were found. However, the
number of status updates, listed, followers and friends were
greater for the open user profiles. The open user profiles
with geo-location enabled were the most active user group
in terms of all features we analyzed. One of the interesting
findings is that protected user profile tend to favorite the
most. Does it mean that they like to keep the favorite tweet
for later and do not want to further propagate the tweet
as when using retweet? Alternatively, favoring might mean
that protected users personally appreciate authors of their
favorite tweets and might motivate their following behavior.
Additionally, we could not find significant differences of
posting status updates and the number of list inclusions
between geo-location enabled users with protected profiles
and users with open profiles. We found also different
fractions of open and closed user profiles for users across
cultural regions. We think that further investigation into
The purpose of different microblogging usage modes
and privacy preferences, preferable with feedback of
microbloggers actively using Twitter services and in respect
of their cultural origins could be further investigated.
Privacy in Social Networks: Furthermore, more than a
third part of user-generated content is shared with default
privacy setting, which often does not correspond with user
needs as revealed in a Facebook user survey [20]. As was
discussed in [21], Facebook applications design might affect
the usage of privacy-related features [15]. In Twitter, users
can protect their content from public view, but online friends
could reveal the initially protected information [5]. In result,
anyone and with any intention could get access to private
and sensitive user information, whether explicitly provided
by users in openly available blogs, or mined with help of
text analysis and other automated tools taking advantage
of existing data mining and machine learning techniques.
In real-life settings and considering users’ willingness to
communicate and social networks, which can leak one’s
private information, there is no really serious protection yet
to ensure human privacy in microblogs, which could be
further enhanced using cryptographic techniques, as in [15].
Additional security measures and further privacy regulations
should be implemented, since the dangers of human privacy
violations in microblogs cannot be disregarded.
Open vs. Commercial Exploitation: Twitter can also be
used by commercial companies as a marketing and commu-
nication tool for influencing their customers, as studied in
[22]. The effectiveness of Twitter and Facebook usage for
hotel marketing purposes was investigated in [23], showing
a strong relationship between social media user experience,
hotel perceptions and further booking intentions. In opposite
to openly available social media content, followers’ control
could open a possibility to paid services [15]. However,
this approach could change microblogging as it is now, and
its impact on openness of content and society at large will
require further consideration.
Research Considerations: Twitter corporation provided
their public tweets archive to the Library of Congress
[24], [25]. Twitter states, that tweets collection opens new
perspectives for research and ways to retrieve information
related to past events [26]. Twitter together with Facebook
and Buzz also made their public content searchable via
Google Search engine [26]. Nevertheless, openly available
Twitter content and meta-data could provide scientists with
much required data for performing research experiments.
However, would it be ethical to access and retain user
data without appropriate consent and potentially infringing
human privacy? The ethical dilemma of using Twitter data
in research while protecting user privacy was discussed in
[27], suggesting to gain institutional review boards approval
before performing data collection of particular users. In our
research, we deal mostly with aggregated user profiles while
analyzing user behavior patterns and preferences. We avoid
data retention of individual users, and anonymize user names
and tweets when needed.
Further Work: Based on the previous works analyzing
differences of sensitive information leaks [4] and personal
and emotional information sharing in Twitter [18] for several
countries, we assumed that the need for privacy control
settings could be related to user cultural origins. Our findings
reveal that persons from different cultural origins have their
own preferences towards Twitter profiles protection. In fur-
ther work, we aim to investigate the microblogging purposes
and their relation to the usage of privacy mechanisms in view
of user cultural context. For this, we plan to update and re-
evaluate our classification models predicting user origins.
Our evaluation could include larger training and test sets,
and human evaluation of the classifiers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Above, we analyzed usage of Twitter profile protection
and geo-location sharing controls. We were interested to find
out if users with protected profiles do not exploit Twitter
features to their full advantage. For this, we statistically
compared user groups of protected and openly available
profiles in terms of their status updates, contact networks
and other features. We found out that protected users
have smaller social networks, which are however not less
influential. Protected users actively favorite other content
compared to the open-profile users without geo-location
services enabled. When users with protected profiles enable
their geo-location services, their tweeting behavior does not
differ significantly from users with open profiles but without
geo-location enabled. When users with open accounts enable
geo-location services, they become the most active while
using the aforementioned Twitter features, except of privacy
setting changes. Protected users change their software
settings the most. It seems, that users preferring to exploit
protected profiles have their own motivation to microblog-
ging. We observed cultural preferences in user profile
protection settings usage, which can be further exploited for
adapting web applications to specific cultural user profiles.
Moreover, despite of the small fraction of protected user
profiles, the human need for privacy in microblogs cannot be
underestimated. We suggest more thorough exploitation of
user generated content, while rising user attention towards
possible privacy threats in microblogs. In further work, we
plan to focus on cultural privacy perception differences in
microblogs while extending our experimental setup with
our previously developed user location detection classifier,
which was re-evaluated with a new test set. In a nutshell, we
suggest to analyze cultural groups’ preferences rather than
individual accounts to preserve human privacy and with a
focus on satisfying user cultural preferences and needs.
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